their populations. They do so by demarcating the population into ethnic categories. They apply labels to individuals and hierarchically order the categories to which they are deemed to belong, awarding one cohort more privilege than the other. Existing literature on such states has obscured the processes by which states reify and institutionalise identity, instead presenting it through groupist frames in which ethnicity is a pre-existing variable. Reconceptualising the doing of ethnicity as a process enables us to study internal dissent against ethnic privilege and consider its transformational capacity in inspiring new nationalist discourses.
Introduction
This article uses the case of Israel to conceptualise state institutionalisation of ethnic categories whilst avoiding 'groupism'. This is an important exercise for a number of reasons, 1 This title pays homage to Rogers Brubaker's Ethnocracy Without Groups (2004) . 2 Correspondence Address: Katie Attwell, Sir Walter Murdoch School of Public Policy and International Affairs, Murdoch University, South Street, Murdoch, WA 6150, Australia. Email: k.attwell@murdoch.edu.au one of which is its contribution to the study of internal dissent against ethnic privilege. Such analysis is limited when undertaken within a framing and language that cement 'identities'.
Scholars analysing Israel as a focal state in which ethnic categories form the basis for differential citizenship have tended to reproduce ubiquitous 'identities' in reifying terms, replicating a wider literature in depicting Israel as the state of an ancient ethnic collective in its historic homeland (see, for example, Klier, 1997; Smith, 1981, p.15; Walzer, 2001) . They pay attention to the evolving meaning and status of Jewishness and Zionism (Shimoni, 1995) , but essentialism regarding Jewish identity still prevails. Even scholars disputing the democratic legitimacy of Israel (Ghanem, 1998) or criticising the etatist frames of scholars (Rabinowitz, 2001, pp. 64-5) have paid insufficient attention to the doing of ethnicity; an analysis which needs to commence by approaching it as a social construction. 1 The constructivist turn within studies of ethnicity and nationalism, featuring salient advice from Brubaker and colleagues (2000) to avoid reification even through terms like identity, provides us with a blazing torch to illuminate earlier debates over Israel's structure and democratic status. I argue that participants in these debates missed the most important point:
we need to understand reification before we can understand institutional categorisation, discrimination and legitimation. Only once we have a handle on reification, and the processes to which it gives rise, can we engage with dissent against ethnic privilege and categorisation, its capacity for transformation, and thus its potential impact on the state's stability.
Accordingly, in this article, I employ the term ethnocratisation to describe the processes carried out by nationalist activists who, in thrall to a particular kind of nationalist discourse, establish states which favour the category to which they see themselves as belonging, at the expense of those deemed Others (Triandafyllidou, 1998) . Using the Israeli case, I elaborate the reification and institutionalisation of categories, and demonstrate how groupist accounting for this can distort what we see, especially when it comes to the task of conceptual classification and demarcation. By paying attention to how participants in the state-building project employ a ressentiment ethnic nationalist discourse, we can move beyond seeing their role as ensuring ethnic privilege; understanding that they create both the 'ethnic' and the 'privilege'. This enables us to consider the price of ongoing enmity for those categorised as the privileged ethnic majority, since such individuals experience ongoing violence at the hands of those constructed as their Other. We can then consider the capacity of such individuals to destabilise ethnocratiser states, which are more commonly framed as vulnerable only to resistance from Others, and even then, questionably. Individuals categorised as the privileged majority might challenge this privilege and point out the ongoing enmity it earns them. More radically, they might challenge categorisation itself, undermining the ressentiment discourse. Researchers cannot assess such potential and therefore explore internal Jewish-Israeli dissent against the Zionist project without an appropriate lens and terminology.
I make the case for such a lens and terminology in this article, suggesting that with the ethnocratiser state in the form of Israel as our focus, we can understand both the doing, and the potential undoing, of ethnicity. Using a non-groupist terminology enables us to eschew presenting groups as real and self-evident, and thereby to stand outside and observe their discursive construction without also being party to it. This opens up possibilities for analysing internal dissent and also for considering conflict resolution. Presenting 'groups' as real and self-evident is a problem when we engage with political action, because when we seek to analyse those who are trying to employ transformational discourses and identifications, we need to be able to engage with their capacity or potential to transgress certain types of belonging and to fashion new ones. If we ourselves are not attuned to these possibilities, we cannot adequately describe or analyse them.
The point of using such a non-groupist approach is not to downgrade the significance and social meaning of ethnic categories for participants. Constructivist scholars recognise the salience of 'group identities' and this is precisely why we want to avoid being swept up in similar common-sense framings in our own work. The fact that participants in 'ethnic conflicts' frame their identifications, lives and social meanings this way gives ethnic categories meaning, and determines behaviour and outcomes. This is, of course, the very reason that scholars engage in the study of ethnic politics and conflict! Thus, refusing to be party to reinscribing and reproducing ethnic categories at an analytical level is -far from being a refusal to recognise their centrality to human life -a prophylactic against being constrained by them intellectually or in the realm of political possibility.
So What Kind Of State Are We Talking About, Exactly?
This article examines a type of state that demarcates its population at an institutional level into ethnic categories. The state applies labels and hierarchically orders categories, awarding one cohort more privilege than the other. The privileged cohort outnumbers the non-privileged, so that elections can occur without disrupting the system of classification and discrimination. Scholars have advanced two labels for such states, with Israel as the central case: 'ethnocracy' and 'ethnic democracy' (Dowty, 1999; Gavison, 1999; Ghanem, 2009; Ghanem, Rouhana, & Yiftachel, 1998; Smooha, 1997) . The key players in the debate over which term should be employed agree upon many of the characteristics of the 'beast' they seek to describe (Dowty, 1999, p.1; Gavison, 1999, p.3) ; at stake is the normative connotation of the label. Are states which offer citizenship to all residents, but national rights only to some, democratic? Is tyranny of the majority democratic? (Sa'di, 2004, p.141 ) And how should we understand the special features of the Israeli case -the occupied territories on the one hand and the content of the Zionist rights claim to Palestine on the other? Scholars have sufficiently explored these questions, but it is worth revisiting how they have used the terms ethnocracy and ethnic democracy to see the points of agreement between them, and thereby identify the key problem with how they frame their analyses.
Regardless of which term the scholars employ, they generally depict the phenomenon under study as resulting from the capture of or creation of the state by a particular ethnic group, and that group's subsequent employment of the state to advance its interests at the expense of resident non-members (Ghanem, 2009, p.463 Wimmer, 2004) . Mazrui (1975) uses it to describe the Ugandan regime; Toshchenko applies it to the post-Soviet Central Asian republics (Arutyunyan, 2004) , whilst Brown (1994) and Fong (2008) apply the term to Burma. Yiftachel is perhaps the most well-published academic on the subject (1997, 1999, 2006) (Dowty, 1999, pp.3-4; Smooha, 2002a, p.497; 2005, p.22) .
Those rejecting Smooha's assessment have tended to cleave to the alternative label offered by ethnocracy. Despite concurring that this specific beast deserves its own category and might be located on a continuum (Ghanem, 2009, p.464) , the critical scholars adamantly reject the label of democracy . Employing a 'maximalist' rather than 'minimalist' definition, the critical scholars argue that the theoretical state in question -and
Israel in practice -contravenes equality and hence does not qualify as democratic (Ghanem, 1998, p.443; Ghanem et al., 1998; Jamal, 2002, pp.424-8) . In the Israeli context, they draw attention to how the Occupied Territories operate within the state, arguing that the lack of citizenship rights for Palestinians means that we cannot understand Israel as a whole to be democratic (Ghanem et al., 1998, p2, 6; Yiftachel, 1999, pp.376-7) . The critical scholars also draw attention to how the roles played by international Zionist organisations in Israeli bureaucracy defy the notion of a demos (Ghanem et al., 1998, p.2, 6; Yiftachel, 1999, pp.376-7) . Like Smooha (1997) (Yiftachel, 2006, pp.20-32) ; Malaysia, Russia, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia (Ghanem, 2009, p.464) .
The debate between the two camps heats up when each side purports to dissect the ideological underpinnings of the other. Smooha's ethnic democracy camp are accused of trying to legitimise a state of affairs from which they personally benefit (Ghanem et al., 1998, pp.8-9; Jamal, 2002, p.412; Rouhana, 1998, p.285; 2006, pp.69-70; Sa'di, 2000, pp.5-6) . In turn, they accuse their opponents of applying a far-too-ambitious definition of democracy in order to 'flunk' Israel (Dowty, 1999, pp.2-3; Gavison, 1999, esp. p.4) . Legal scholar Ruth
Gavison goes so far as to rule out the possibility of anyone entering these debates without a political agenda (1999, p.5) .
Regardless of which side we take, however, both available terms are problematic from a constructivist perspective. In representing the state as 'captured' by the 'dominant ethnic group' (Ghanem, 2009, p.463) , both ethnic democracy and ethnocracy assert the prior objective existence of ethnic groups. Brubaker (2011) , who uses a terminology of 'nationalizing states' and 'titular nations' when he writes about these kinds of cases, cautions us to consider the detrimental effects of invoking ethnic groups (and hence ethnic violence or ethnic conflicts). Actors on the ground frame events in such language, sometimes lulling even those of us who purport to be constructivists into a conceptual stupor, wherein we find ourselves employing these 'categories of ethnopolitical practice' as 'categories of social analysis.' (Brubaker, 2004, p.10 Employing such an approach enables a scholar to 'avoid unintentionally doubling or reinforcing the reification of ethnic groups in ethnopolitical practice with a reification of such groups in social analysis.' (p.10, his italics) Since both ethnocracy and ethnic democracy depict rule by self-evident ethnic group, examining reification and institutionalisation can direct us towards an alternative, non-groupist label. The benefit of using such a label is that terms used by scholars actually translate out into the world of political action. A case in point is Yiftachel's 'ethnocracy', which activists have used in their own descriptions of Israel's history and structure (Attwell, 2015) . If we have evidence that the terms and analyses that scholars employ impact participants' undertaking of political struggle, then we have a responsibility to consider whether these terms might actually reproduce and reinscribe categories whose absence might generate other possibilities for social identification and hence conflict resolution. This is not to say that a mere language change is sufficient for this purpose, but rather that if we don't consider how a language change can shift our own thinking, we also preclude that possibility for the participants in conflicts who are our research subjects.
Ressentiment Discourses And Ethnocratisation
In order to arrive at this new terminology, we need to track the process by which people come to see themselves as ethnic actors and mobilise to form a state that reflects this primary identification. We can understand ethnocratisation as a process that commences with political activists constructing a ressentiment nationalist discourse, employing ethnic categories to demarcate the Us from the Other. The term ressentiment, originally used by Nietzsche to describe hatred and envy of one's perceived oppressors (Morelli, 1998) ; was subsequently applied to nationalism by Greenfeld and Chirot (1992; . Ressentiment describes the tendency of certain nationalist discourses to depict their Others in demonised terms whilst elevating the virtue of the Us. Greenfeld and Chirot (1992; in Central and Eastern Europe. Here, the wider context was ethnic nationalism rather than civic nationalism. As Jewish individuals were discursively reconfigured from members of an alien religion to members of an alien nation (Greenfeld & Chirot, 1994, p.100; Rabkin, 2010, p.17) , Zionists responded with an ethnic nationalist discourse that mimicked the traits of the discourses inspiring them (Sand, 2009) . They mobilised the Jewish category with which they were Othered as the basis for their own nationalism. We can understand this as transvaluation, but not of types of nationalism, as Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) Others.
The point to take from this crude outline is that such a state would be the logical (though not necessarily attainable) conclusion of a ressentiment ethnic nationalist discourse.
It makes complete sense that people embroiled in such conflicts, holding tight to such categories, would, if possible, set up states that institutionalised and awarded protection and privilege to the one to which they saw themselves as belonging. In such a context, it would be seen as essential to not only differentiate the Us from the Other, but also to remain permanently separated. Analysis of this process challenges our thinking about the concept of self-determination, insofar as its logical conclusion should be letting 'ethnic groups' decide how to live and interact with those defined as non-members. When the 'self' signified by self-determination is not only an 'ethnic' self but also a 'collective' self (or selves), privileging this aspect of identity without regard for its constructed nature precludes us from considering the ensuing processes of conflict as contingent on that very moment -and act - We can understand the state to operationalise ressentiment ethnic nationalist discourse by undertaking discriminatory containerisation. Containerisation involves the creation of categories and the continual process of convincing citizens and subjects that they belong inside them. Containerisation can be seen in any number of states which formally institutionalise ethnic categories, such as consociational democracies which can be seen to do so on an equalizing basis (Wimmer, 2008 (Wimmer, , pp.1037 attention to the differential placement of containers in conflict generation (Ghanem, 1998, p.430) , but given scant recognition to the fact that the objects of placement are indeed containers, rather than groups. My aim is to draw attention to the containers, whose existence continues even as their contents shift.
Thus, containers precede content in this process. While the state's job is to convince the population that the containers exist purely for the purpose of demarcating the "stuff"
inside from other "stuff", the container -the boundary -is paramount (Barth, 1969) . The state's job is to maintain the static labels on containers' outsides as it creates groups, institutionalises them, represents them as self-evident and privileges or de-privileges them. It does not obscure the discrimination, which is plain for all to see, and justified ideologically. It obscures the containerisation itself -the very act of reifying and institutionalising ethnic categories.
Despite the effectiveness of this process, however, ethnic categories can never be the fixed entities that they purport to be, and hence can never really do the job for which they are mobilised. A ressentiment discourse demands the classification of the Good Us and the Evil
Other based on lasting, reliable categories; ethnic categories, being discursive, are not fully fit for the job (Lentin, 2010, p.157) . Moreover, the contents of containers changes over time, hence categories are vulnerable to dissolution; in non-conflict situations, so-called ethnic markers lose salience. Effort, therefore, must go into both the practice of containerisation and maintaining the fiction of fixed contents.
The actual fluidity of contents appears in the Israeli case with the definition of (privileged) Jewishness expanded to include individuals not religiously defined as Jews, and partners (provided they are not non-Jews from the occupied territories -see Peled 2007, 338-40) . Vibrant debates about 'who is a Jew' (Handelman, 1994, pp.446-449; Shafir & Peled, 1998, p.413) have occurred alongside wider ongoing renegotiations, including questions about whether privilege based on categorisation is a good thing (Davis, 2003; Halper, 2008; . But transformations within categories and what Barth (1969) depicts as the permeability of boundaries should not blind us to the ongoing institutional maintenance of their existence.
In the Israeli case, the emphasis on the boundary between Jew and Arab has actually informed the elasticity of the content, but not category, of Jewishness. Boundary maintenance played a significant role in the broadening of the legal meaning of Jewishness for citizenship entitlement to individuals with a single Jewish grandparent. This vastly increased the reservoir from which Jewish immigration could be drawn, staving off the demographic threat to Jewish domination (Lustick, 1999, pp.425-8; Peled, 2007, p.349) . Thus, it was precisely the need to maintain the boundary that provoked the expansion, even if the unintended effect was the creation of a new sub-container within the Jewish one, for the subsequent category of non-and doubtful Jews (see alsoAl-Haj, 2002; Shafir & Peled, 1998, p.413) .
Within their allocated containers, privileged individuals encounter state policies, practices and procedures, internalising the label as taken-for-granted and accepting the legitimation provided for their own hegemony. Those deemed Other encounter these same 'instruments' (Brubaker, 2011 (Brubaker, , p.1797 ) with the converse effect -they experience a system that they deem illegitimate because it is discriminatory and exclusive. Institutionalisation of categories of victor and vanquished at the hands of the state thus affirms two ressentiment discourses, reproduced through legal categories and thus life experiences.
It follows that rather than installing the privilege of the ruling 'ethnic group,' such states work to the detriment of all. The state does not work for those depicted as national members, but rather for an ideology; a way of seeing oneself as national being and Virtuous Victim. Discriminatory containerisation creates ongoing conflict, which participants can only explain using a ressentiment depiction of the Other as deserving mistreatment. This mistreatment variously takes the form of support for legal and political subjugation and military domination, or conversely, violent resistance. Either way, from either side, the demonised Other appears a legitimate target for one's own violence, depicted as the selfdefence of a Virtuous nation in perpetual conflict.
Conceptual Classification
In the above elaboration, I have brought ethnocratisation to the fore, and I now 
Authoritarian Rule, Democracy and Demography
In the existing literature, a defining feature of ethnocratiser states is the numerical domination of the central ethnic nation (Ghanem, 2009, p.463; Smooha, 2002a , pp.478-9) .
To reframe this in non-groupist language, individuals deemed by the state to belong to the privileged nation outnumber designated non-members, enabling the awarding of privilege under the guise of democratic rule.
Accordingly, scholars have made a distinction between ethnocratiser states and explicitly authoritarian regimes (such as Herrenvolk democracies) in which a smaller cohort dominates a larger one, and hence elections would disrupt its ethnic rule (Smooha, 2002a, p.480) . Participants in the classificatory project accept this distinction as legitimate.
Meanwhile, debate derives from the fact that, unlike in Herrenvolk democracies, elections
occur, yet some critics still regard the states as undemocratic because elections are conducted along ethnic lines and the state denies the minority any special rights or veto (Ghanem et al., 1998, p.4) .
The distinction between Herrenvolk democracies and ethnocratiser states might be one of circumstance (relative population sizes) and tactic (authoritarian rule used only when 'democratic' domination is not possible). However, most theorists recognise that ethnic rule operates differently in both contexts, with ethnocratiser states forced by their democratic facade to offer considerably more rights to the subjugated Other than outright authoritarianism would require (Smooha, 2002a, p.480; . Even those who emphasise the ethnic rule common to both (Ghanem, 1998 ) make a distinction between states where domination is achieved via electoral process, and those where it is achieved via authoritarian subjugation (Ghanem, 1998; 2009, p.463) . (Piterberg, 2001, p.56; Sa'di, 2004, p.142) . Since then, a suite of policies making the lives of non-Jews uncomfortable (Peled, 2007, p.357) , and an accompanying discourse of 'transfer' (Peled, 2007, pp.347-50; Yiftachel & Gordon, 2002) , have legitimised the project of protecting the state's 'Jewish and democratic' character by seeking to reduce the numbers of 'Arabs' in her official borders (Peled, 2007, p.345; Sa'di, 2004, pp.142-3) .
On this basis, when we observe that the privileged 'ethnic nation' is numerically dominant in ethnocratiser states, we should emphasise that this numerical dominance is neither a factual accident nor a pre-existing state of affairs. Rather, (at least) two discourses must have already emerged through which individuals speak about themselves in ethnic terms and understand their Other to be a barrier to happiness, prosperity, statehood or even life itself. Only in the context of these two discourses does the question of demographic proportions even arise. This very question may produce answers such as ethnic cleansing, repression and exclusion. Such policy responses offer the promise of hegemony via numerical dominance, rather than the more unpalatable option of hegemony via authoritarianism or -worse -ending up as the subjugated Other. By understanding the given proportions of cohorts as constructions of discourse, rather than a natural occurrence, we can properly focus on how 'the numbers' are played before, during and after the establishment of ethnocratiser states, and consider the consequences of this process for participants. Bringing this non-groupist analysis to questions around 'majorities' and 'minorities' can potentially inform how actors themselves see their situation. Seeing Israel as an 'ethncratiser state' -in which the very project has been ethnic construction, privilege and domination -rather than as an 'ethnocracy' in which a larger group has dominated a smaller one, engages with aspects of Zionist history such as violence and ethnic cleansing. These might otherwise not be as fully integrated into one's thinking about the state's type, even if one is aware of this history (see, for example, the engagement with these in the conceptualisation of .
Demarcation from Liberal Democratic "Ethnic Core" States
At the other end the continuum, while most scholars have argued that we should distinguish ethnocratiser states from ordinary liberal democracies (Smooha, 2002b, p.425; Yiftachel, 2006, p.21) , this claim might prompt questions about whether the politics of ethnicity in the former and the latter are really that different. If we start by identifying what we mean by the liberal democratic states to which ethnocratiser states might (erroneously) be likened, we find arguments such as that offered by Yiftachel, who argues that 'most nation states advance a project of ethnic domination, ' (2006, p.21) . 4 Smith (1999) makes a similar proposition when he argues that all nations are formed around an ethnic core (see also Wimmer, 2008 , p.1032 . These arguments invoke the (groupist) idea that we might, in many or most states, find a dominant group at the centre and marginalised ones outside it. Some might then argue that this situation is not markedly different from an ethnocratiser state. I disagree with both elements of this proposition, and with the groupist language framing them. In offering a non-groupist formulation of so-called 'ethnic core' states, the crucial differences between such states and ethnocratiser states become apparent.
If we reframe the concept of liberal democratic 'ethnic core' states in non-groupist language, we would note that in some states, individuals with religious, linguistic or physical differences from people around them may identify as minorities. This may be accentuated when business and education are conducted with languages and cultural norms shared by a larger proportion of the population, or when individuals who identify as minorities are treated differently by some of their fellow citizens. However, these individuals are not objectively minorities because they might learn the dominant language, adopt the cultural norms and thrive in mainstream society, effectively escaping marginal status.
In elucidating the status of so-called minorities in so-called 'ethnic core' states, we can see the crucial difference between liberal democratic states and ethnocratiser states.
Liberal democracies work towards a project of universal citizenship (Yiftachel, 2006, p.21) , which is not necessarily benign; in fact it can be brutal. States might encourage or enforce the use of a single language in public life; they might only recognise one set of religious holidays and cultural practices, and critics could even accuse them of forcible assimilation and cultural destruction of those who identify as minorities. They may also not provide sufficient resources to incorporate those from outside the central culture, resulting in a dispossessed underclass. Nevertheless, as a matter of policy these states do not deliberately exclude those within. However oppressive the so-called civic project may prove -however much it might ask one to give up in order to belong, and however inadequately it may resource such a transformation -it still permits all members of society the option of integration (Yiftachel, 2006, p.21) .
By contrast, ethnocratiser states feature the 'deliberate undermining of the political demos' so as to exclude sectors of it. They 'use the rhetoric of the nation-state but do not allow minorities any feasible path of inclusion' (Yiftachel, 2006, p.21) . 'The state is constructed so as to prevent the integration of minorities' who remain ever Othered, given a second-class status and no option of trading it in and moving up in the social order. (Yiftachel, 2006, p.21) . 5 Thus while ethnicity undoubtedly is 'done' within both 'ordinary liberal democracies' and ethnocratiser states, the state's role in this 'doing' differs vastly.
Analysing this 'doing' from an explicitly non-groupist perspective enables us to distinguish ethnocratiser states effectively from the liberal democratic model.
Such an act of distinguishing brings to the fore the alternative to ethnic nationalismcivic nationalism -which can be more effectively mobilised as a nationalist discourse within 'ordinary liberal democracies'. I have alluded above to the potential failures of this discourse to be translated and implemented in a way that ensures real equality and social justice;
failures which have been evidenced in numerous real world examples (Spencer & Wollman, 2005) . However, civic nationalism as an aspirational discourse -as somewhere to go from ethnic nationalism and 'ethnic' conflict -has much to offer in a case such as Israel, where a watering-down of ethnic identification would open up alternative possibilities for state structure. While both the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian nationalist discourses are currently a long way from embracing civic nationalism, it presents itself within, for example, Israeli post-Zionist yearnings for a state of its citizens (Attwell, 2015) . While such a state would demonstrate the limitations of 'ethnic core' liberal democracy in still having a culturally Jewish frame of reference, Israel's current cohort of non-Jewish citizens would enjoy greater equality and have a more feasible path of integration into a state no longer constituted by their absence. This would limit some of the factors contributing to the current political conflict. The point is that both scholars and participants would need to be able to engage with de-identification for this even to be a possibility. A non-groupist framing of the existing state provides a starting point for such thinking.
Concluding Remarks: Implications Of A Non-Groupist Conceptualisation
Constructivist scholars seek to explain the world without falling into perceptual traps.
In the 'ethnocracy' vs. 'ethnic democracy' debates that began the process of describing and explaining the state of Israel, these traps at least partly ensnare some of the participants, who pay inadequate attention to the processes by which labels used in discourses become purveyors of legal meaning. When academics of all moral persuasions present the contents of containers as indistinct from the containers themselves -when they present groups as real and self-evident -they become party to the ethnocratiser state's work. Such academics are not merely being groupist; they are actually employing the logic of the ressentiment discourse behind ethnocratisation in an attempt to explain its consequences. This is problematic analytically, because we are at risk of black-boxing the very phenomenon we seek to understand. If we regard ethnocratisation as an outcome generated by 'ethnic groups' as actors, this limits how we might unpack the social processes occurring and the methods for resolution that might flow from this exercise. Presenting 'groups' as real and self-evident is also a problem when we engage with political action, because when we seek to analyse those who are trying to employ transformational discourses and identifications, we need to be able to engage with their capacity or potential to transgress certain types of belonging and to fashion new ones, such as through civic nationalism. Once we take this view, we can challenge some of the assumptions about ethnocratiser states. Key amongst these assumptions has been that, as state of and for a certain nation, those deemed to belong to this nation benefit from such an arrangement.
Whilst it is certainly true that such individuals enjoy greater privileges than those demarcated as Other, both constructed nations become locked into a state of apparently perpetual enmity.
Literatures on ethnic democracy (Smooha, 2002a, p.481) and ethnocracy (Yiftachel, 2005, p.127) recognise (to varying degrees) that the institutionalisation of privilege creates ongoing conflict, with one 'nation' seeking access to that which is denied, and the other considering itself in need of protection from such advances. However, scholars have not sufficiently emphasised the institutionalisation of ethnicity itself in creating this conflict. Viewed from this perspective, the institutionalisation of ethnicity appears equally problematic for the privileged 'nation' as well as the de-privileged one, since individuals labelled as either category experience ongoing violence at the hands of those constructed as Other.
This then offers us different ways of imagining the evolution of such states. In the existing literature, ethnic democracy scholars foresee stability as the 'minority' mobilises to a limited extent around the democratic elements of ethnic democracy (Smooha, 1999; 2005, p. 22; see also critique in Ghanem, Rouhana et al. 1998, p.4 ) . Ethnocracy scholars counter that the dissonance between representations of democracy and the reality of ethnic rule will become points at which the repressed minority chip away, exposing the true nature of the regime and hence de-stabilising it (Yiftachel, 2006, p.39) . However, both these predicted outcomes focus on the 'minority'; scholars pay little attention to how those deemed to belong to the privileged nation might influence these processes. It seems taken-for-granted that individuals categorised as such will continue to support their own privilege, emphasising the democratic aspects of the current arrangement and averting their gazes from the more problematic features of this for the Other (Ghanem et al., 1998, pp.8-9; Rouhana, 2006, pp.69-70) .
Nevertheless, a possibility remains that such individuals might destabilise ethnocratiser states. This can occur only if these individuals recognise that they, too, suffer through ongoing discriminatory containerisation. They might challenge their own privilege and point out the ongoing enmity it earns them. More radically, they might challenge categorisation itself, undermining the ressentiment discourse. However, in order for researchers to be able to assess such potential, we must have an appropriate lens and terminology. I analysed Israeli Jews who spoke cogently on these matters, but had to attune myself in order to ask the right questions (Attwell, 2013) . Such possibilities open up when we reframe ethnocratiser states not as agent of ethnic group, but as agent of ressentiment discourse. Ozkirimli (2003) suggests that a constructivist academic approach inherently seeks 
Notes

1
This terminology of 'doing' ethnicity borrows from West and Zimmerman's (1987) notion of 'doing' gender, and Deutsch's (2007) 'undoing gender' critique. It draws our attention to the performative, institutional and discursive means by which something that appears natural is, in fact created for and by participants, seemingly with their consent, but with the potential for resistance. 2 Interestingly, it took the most militarised and extreme form of Zionism to recognise the rights claims of the Other, even if this recognition occurred in the process of denial (Shlaim 2000, pp.11-16) . 3 Shohat (1999) and Behar (2007) describe how the Palestinian nationalist discourse unwittingly reproduced and reinforced the Zionist discourse's ethnicised framing and praxis in Palestine. Shohat (1999) explains that nationalists in the Arab world sought to end colonial rule by inventing 'third world nations… according to the definitions supplied by the often Eurocentric ideologies' (pp.8-9), unhelpfully leading anti-Zionists to articulate 'the idea of a homogenous 'Jewish Nation"' (p.13). 4 Yiftachel cites Brubaker (1996) here, but Brubaker actually frames this proposition in less groupist terms. 5 Yiftachel (2006) offers an extreme version of this logic in Sri Lanka, where the Sinhalese ethnocratiser state denies over one million long-term residents citizenship, labelling them 'Indian Tamils' as distinct from 'Sri Lankan Tamil' citizens of the state, who are also Othered by the regime (p.23).
